Course Description
This course reviews recent advancements in the theory of collusion and discusses the gap between current theory and empirical findings on cartels towards identifying avenues for future research. After reviewing the standard repeated game model of collusion, the course moves on to cover recent work which encompasses private monitoring of compliance with a collusive agreement, firms having private information on cost and demand, investment, detection by customers and the competition authority, and cartel formation and dissolution. Competition policy issues are explored with an examination of corporate leniency programs and other anti-cartel policies as well as looking into the coordinated effects of mergers. Empirical methods related to the detection of cartels are also covered.
Instructor
Professor of Economics,Johns Hopkins University. Ph. D. in Economics, Duke University (1984). Professor Harrington’s research interests include Industrial Organization, Organizations, Microeconomic Theory. He is a well know expert on the topics of collusion and cartels. He has published his research the most prestigious journals, including Econometrica, American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, The RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Industrial Economics, International Economic Review among other journals. He is currently co-editor of Industrial Organization, and previously he has been editor of RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Dates
June 7-11: 17:15-19:15
Venue:
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (Getafe Campus)
Calle Madrid, 126
Building 15, Room 15.0.15 (
Map)
Registration Fee
500 Euros*
*Fee covers the course and accompanying materials. The registration fee for students currently enrolled in a Ph.D. program is reduced to 300 euros. Course attendees need to arrange and pay for their own lodging. Students may apply for scholar
ships by sending an application letter documenting the merits of their request to the Director of SSECO, Juan J. Dolado, at
instituto.economia@uc3m.es, indicating as subject “SSECO-scholarship”. Application will be accepted a week before the course start if space available.
Course Description
This course reviews recent advancements in the theory of collusion and discusses the gap between current theory and empirical findings on cartels towards identifying avenues for future research. After reviewing the standard repeated game model of collusion, the course moves on to cover recent work which encompasses private monitoring of compliance with a collusive agreement, firms having private information on cost and demand, investment, detection by customers and the competition authority, and cartel formation and dissolution. Competition policy issues are explored with an examination of corporate leniency programs and other anti-cartel policies as well as looking into the coordinated effects of mergers. Empirical methods related to the detection of cartels are also covered.
Instructor
Professor of Economics,Johns Hopkins University. Ph. D. in Economics, Duke University (1984). Professor Harrington’s research interests include Industrial Organization, Organizations, Microeconomic Theory. He is a well know expert on the topics of collusion and cartels. He has published his research the most prestigious journals, including Econometrica, American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, The RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Industrial Economics, International Economic Review among other journals. He is currently co-editor of Industrial Organization, and previously he has been editor of RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Dates
June 7-11: 17:15-19:15
Venue:
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (Getafe Campus)
Calle Madrid, 126
Building 15, Room 15.0.15 (
Map)
Registration Fee
500 Euros*
*Fee covers the course and accompanying materials. The registration fee for students currently enrolled in a Ph.D. program is reduced to 300 euros. Course attendees need to arrange and pay for their own lodging. Students may apply for scholar
ships by sending an application letter documenting the merits of their request to the Director of SSECO, Juan J. Dolado, at
instituto.economia@uc3m.es, indicating as subject “SSECO-scholarship”. Application will be accepted a week before the course start if space available.